Measuring and Unpacking Affective Polarization on Twitter: The Role of Party and Gender in the 2018 Senate Races by Mentzer, Kevin et al.
  
Measuring and Unpacking Affective Polarization on Twitter: 
The Role of Party and Gender in the 2018 Senate Races 
 
Kevin Mentzer 
Bryant University 
kmentzer@bryant.edu 
 
Kate Fallon 
Bryant University 
katefallonn@gmail.com 
 
Janet Prichard 
Bryant University 
prichard@bryant.edu 
 
David J. Yates 
Bentley University 
dyates@bentley.edu 
Abstract 
This study examines how the Twittersphere talked 
about candidates running for the U.S senate in the 2018 
congressional elections. We classify Twitter users as 
Liberal or Conservative to better understand how the 
two groups use social media during a major national 
political election. Using tweet sentiment, we assess how 
the Twittersphere felt about in-group party versus out-
group party candidates. When we further break these 
findings down based on the candidates’ gender, we find 
that male senatorial candidates were talked about more 
positively than female candidates. We also find that 
Conservatives talked more positively about female 
Republican candidates than they did about Republican 
male candidates. Female candidates of the out-group 
party were talked about the least favorably of all 
candidates. Conservative tweeters exhibit the most 
positive level of in-group party sentiment and the most 
negative level of out-group party sentiment. We 
therefore attribute the most intense affective 
polarization to this ideological group. 
1. Introduction 
Partisan polarization in the United States Congress 
is at the core of many challenges that Congress faces in 
order to become more effective [33]. It increases 
gridlock, decreases the quality of the legislation that 
guides the governance of the country, and harms the 
functioning of the executive and judicial branches of 
government [37]. Unfortunately, the level of partisan 
polarization has increased in the 21st century. In part 
this has been in reaction to watershed events such as the 
presidential elections of 2000, 2008 and 2016 [44, 45] 
and the confirmation of six justices to the Supreme 
Court by the U.S. Senate [12]. 
When discussing partisan polarization it is important 
to distinguish between different types of polarization. 
For example, ideological polarization is the extent to 
which the ideological policy positions differ between 
parties [2] whereas affective polarization is the extent to 
which supporters of one party (or group) dislike the 
members of other parties (or other groups) [27]. While 
most studies, when measuring partisan polarization, 
have focused on ideological polarization, the focus of 
this work is to examine affective polarization. It is vital 
that we understand the drivers of this type of 
polarization since affective polarization can lead to 
democratic erosion [19]. As the general public 
increasingly turns to social media for their source of 
information [53], and partisan discourse leads to an 
increase in affective polarization [38, 50], it is important 
to understand the discourse on social media during 
election campaigns [49]. 
Even though progress has been made towards 
decreasing the gender disparity among public officials 
at many levels of government [17], it is important to 
measure, track, and understand how this disparity is 
changing over time [52]. Specifically, it is important to 
unpack to what extent the projection of gender 
stereotypes onto congressional candidates is being 
perpetuated during national elections [13, 16, 18, 25, 
26]. 
It is ironic that at a time when the language of 
polarization has become male stereotyped, e.g., using 
words like warfare, warriors, and combatants [22, 30, 
46], that women voters have the most power to shape 
the future of partisan polarization as they vote. 
According to Carroll and Fox [8], women are the largest 
demographic block of registered voters in the U.S. and 
about 9.9 million more women voted than men in the 
2016 election. 
1.1. Affective Polarization 
The main goals of this study are to a) determine 
whether affective polarization can be measured using 
Twitter data and b) to unpack affective polarization, as 
it is expressed on Twitter [28], to better understand what 
may be driving this polarization. Iyengar et al. [27], 
using data from the American National Election Study 
(ANES), measure affective polarization as the 
difference between mean in-party feeling and mean out-
party feeling. They show that affective polarization has 
significantly increased over the last three decades. We 
propose and define a Twitter-based measure of affective 
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polarization as the difference between mean in-group 
party tweet sentiment [48] and mean out-group party 
sentiment [29]. This Us-versus-Them [19] measure 
provides a way to quantify the level of mass affective 
polarization, by measuring the animosity between 
ideological groups or political parties, in near real-time. 
We use the U.S. Senate elections in 2018 as the 
empirical context to test the validity of this measure and 
use the tweets gathered about (or by) candidates running 
for Senate to unpack what is behind affective 
polarization on Twitter. We will unpack the data based 
upon four different dimensions: 
 Ideology and gender of Twitter user; and, 
 Party and gender of senatorial candidate(s) 
mentioned in the tweet. 
Through this analysis we will better understand what 
role gender plays, both the gender of the citizen as well 
as gender of the candidate, with respect to affective 
polarization. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
The next section is a literature review focused on 
partisan polarization and differences and disparities in 
U.S. politics and elections that are driven by party and 
gender. Section 3 describes our data and methods. 
Section 4 presents and discusses our results. Section 5 
presents our conclusions and we cover limitations and 
future work in Section 6. 
2. Polarization, Party and Gender 
Mass partisan polarization among citizens is most 
commonly measured using surveys and focus groups 
[36] and has focused on ideological polarization [2]. 
During an election cycle such tools are supplemented 
with frequent opinion polls [1]. Since roll-call votes, 
answers to questions, coded interview data, and 
responses to polls are very often tied to the party and 
gender of a public official, a candidate, or a respondent, 
the data produced by these instruments has been of keen 
interest to many scholars, e.g., [8, 31]. Of course, such 
research has sometimes focused on the connections 
between polarization and party [51], gender [43], or 
both [16, 26]. In the age of social media, this work has 
been extended to determine and characterize differences 
in public opinion and sentiment on a variety of topics [3, 
41, 47, 49]. Within this body of work, Twitter has 
increasingly played a key role, rapidly speeding up both 
the scope of political campaigns and their coverage 
while providing researchers with a rich source of data.  
Tweets reflect the thoughts of millions of people in 
real-time. In 280 characters or less, a candidate, 
journalist, or voter can publish their thoughts for others 
to see. While discussions questioning the validity of 
polls and their predictive power on election outcomes 
have increasingly circulated since Donald Trump’s 
victory in 2016, Twitter’s role has only broadened, 
transforming it into a catalyst for political 
communication as well as a gauge for public opinion 
[24, 53]. 
2.1. Measuring Twitter-Based Affective 
Polarization 
Early work in the social media era analyzed online 
citizen sentiment and emotion with the goal of 
measuring public opinion [42] and even predicting 
election results [7]. However, systematic ways of 
making complex inferences like predicting the results of 
an election remained, and continue to be, elusive [20]. 
The present study extends the work of Conover, 
Dang-Xuan, Iyengar, Steiglitz and others [10, 11, 27, 
28, 29, 48] by proposing to systematically measure 
affective polarization as the difference between 
sentiment about one’s own party (in-group party) [48] 
and sentiment about opposing parties (out-group 
parties) [29] as expressed on Twitter.  
While we expect affective polarization to be evident, 
we are cognizant that using social media data comes 
with some concerns. In particular, the n=all fallacy [34], 
which is the assumption that, through the use of “big 
data,” scholars can position their arguments as universal 
– based on digital trace data – even though these traces 
might be influenced by social media companies or other 
organizations [53], and are likely skewed to a younger 
population than the general public. These limitations 
thus motivate the exploratory nature of this study. 
2.2. Gender Differences and Disparity 
The existence of gender stereotyping in American 
politics has been clearly documented, e.g. in [13]. 
Research in this area has focused on a variety of topics, 
including the successes and failures of women in 
elections [14, 15, 40] and the nature and tone of 
discourse surrounding women in the public sphere [38]. 
Even though the link between gender and political 
representation has evolved, stereotypes can play a role 
in the actions of voters and women have yet to be seen 
as equals in the political arena [8]. 
Differing expectations among voters regarding the 
capabilities of a politician are routinely based on gender, 
providing the most consistent evidence to prove the 
existence of gender stereotyping in politics [43, 54]. In 
response successful women have recognized where they 
stand among voters and have crafted their strategy 
accordingly. The challenge that female candidates must 
endure within this process is to wage campaigns that 
showcase any dispositions toward gender as an asset 
rather than a liability [4, 14, 26]. 
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The present climate of partisan polarization and the 
rapid and efficient transmission of polarizing messages 
via social media present many challenges to researchers. 
In general, what means do we have to understand how 
Liberal and Conservative voters evaluate male and 
female candidates? We used the following research 
questions to guide this research: 
 RQ1: Can Twitter be used to measure affective 
polarization? 
 RQ2: Does affective polarization differ by ideology 
or gender of the Twitter user? 
 RQ3: Does the party or gender of a candidate affect 
the level of affective polarization on Twitter? 
 RQ4: In the context of congressional elections, does 
tweet content provide hints as to what issues or 
events might be fueling affective polarization? 
3. Data and Methods 
This study uses data from a 7-week time frame from 
September 27 through November 13, 2018. This 
represents 6 weeks leading up to the election and a week 
post-election. 
There were 33 senate races in the 2018 elections 
with 102 candidates on the ballots. We identified the 
primary Twitter handle for 87 candidates; the remainder 
of the candidates did not have a Twitter account. A 
Python script using the Twitter Listener API in the 
Twython library [39] was developed and deployed using 
the list of handles. Overall we collected 17,178,617 
tweets. However, the Twitter API does not just look in 
the tweet text alone for a match but also looks at URLs, 
screen names, etc. We filtered the tweets down to those 
that specifically mentioned at least one candidate in the 
text of the tweet itself. This reduced our overall tweet 
dataset down to 12,595,639. 
3.1. Ideological Affinity 
Accurately predicting political alignment or 
tendencies has been of significant interest. Many 
techniques have been employed with varying success. 
Some of the more popular techniques employed when 
analyzing Twitter data have been keyword, or hashtag, 
analysis, analyzing the follower network, and analyzing 
the retweet network. Conover et al. [10] report a 95% 
success rate when utilizing the retweet approach. We 
should note that others have found this approach not as 
successful when the conversation being analyzed was 
non-political [9]. Since our conversation is political in 
nature, we adopted this approach.  
From our database of tweets we identified and 
extracted the retweets. These were then used to identify 
how frequently someone retweeted someone else. This 
data was used to build a weighted and directed social 
network which we imported into the networking tool 
Gephi [6]. Only those users who either retweeted 
someone else, or were retweeted by someone, were 
imported into Gephi. Users who didn’t participate in 
retweeting were excluded. While our approach forced us 
to exclude users who did not participate in retweeting, 
we feel this was justified since the primary motivation 
for political speech is to spread the message which is 
accomplished through retweets. The result was 1.4M 
unique Twitter users identified as retweet participants 
with 4.7M weighted connections between those 
participants.  
Using the Gephi software tool, we used this 
weighted directed network to identify communities 
within the network. Gephi found 484,701 communities. 
While the number of individual communities was quite 
large, we found that we could account for 63% of 
participants by using the top 10 communities, with each 
participant being assigned to one and only one 
community. Once we moved beyond the top 10 
communities, the subsequent communities represented 
0.11% or less of the total number of nodes. 
To assign an ideological affinity to each community 
we looked at the top 10 retweeted users in each and 
manually classified these accounts as Liberal or 
Conservative. These are the users whose message is 
being spread the most by the community and therefore, 
we argue, best represent the ideology of that 
community. For example, the largest community 
represents 28.59% of all nodes with the top two 
retweeted accounts managed by anti-Trump brothers 
Brian and Ed Krassenstein (these accounts have since 
been banned by Twitter). This network was classified as 
Liberal. The second largest network represents 21.71% 
of all nodes with the number one retweeted account 
being @realdonaldtrump (President Trump’s personal 
Twitter account). This network was classified as 
Conservative.  
In all communities with the exception of one 
discussed below, the top 10 accounts matched in their 
ideological affinity. In the final case it was unclear 
which ideology to assign to this community based on the 
top 10 accounts. In this case the top retweeted accounts 
were all discussing immigration issues related to 
professionals coming mainly from Asian countries. The 
primary accounts did not appear to be promoting one set 
of candidates over the other. We will discuss why we 
classified these accounts as Liberal next.  
Following the manual classification, we used Gephi 
to visualize the network using the Force Atlas 2 layout 
algorithm [32]. As can be seen in Figure 1, two large 
distinct communities emerged and appear as the dark 
pink (the primary Liberal community) and green (the 
primary Conservative community). Barberá et al. [5] 
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found a similar clear pattern of two distinct ideologies 
when displaying the follower network in the 2012 
election. Using proximity to these two communities we 
validate the classification of each sub-community. In all 
cases, our manual classification was supported by the 
proximity to primary community. For the immigration 
community (shown as a small purple community to the 
left of the Liberal communities) we found that it truly 
was segmented off to the side, however there were more 
connections into the other Liberal communities than into 
the Conservative communities and, as such, we 
classified this community as Liberal. 
Next we exported the community information out of 
Gephi in order to assign an ideological affinity back to 
our tweet dataset. Using the community identification, 
and the membership of each user, we were able to assign 
the community back to the original tweet dataset, 
including those that were not involved in retweets. 
While we only manually classified the top 10 
communities which represented 63.09% of those 
accounts who were involved with retweeting, those 
accounts represented 78.9% of all the tweets gathered 
during our 7-week period. This represents just under 
10M tweets and is the dataset we used for the rest of our 
analysis. (See Table 2 in the online Appendix.) Overall, 
the split of total tweets was 50% Liberal and 50% 
Conservative showing that both ideological groups had 
the same level of discussion occurring.  
3.2. Sentiment 
Next we scored each tweet for sentiment. We began 
by stripping all punctuation from the tweet text. Each 
tweet was scored for sentiment using the Python 
TextBlob library [35]. Sentiment score ranges from -1 
(extremely negative) to +1 (extremely positive). For 
example, the following retweet was scored -1.0 
(extremely negative): 
“rt harrietbaldwin amyklobuchar you are going to 
lose disgusting duplicitous democrat” 
and this tweet was scored 1.0 (extremely positive):  
“the very best man to serve all connecticut 
residents without bias❗️ 
vote mattcoreyct takebackct” 
3.3. Gender Classification 
To identify the gender of the Twitter user we used 
the Python based Gender-guesser library [21]. This 
package predicts a gender based on the first name.  We 
broke out the Twitter username and used the first word 
in that name as the first name.  Each name was classified 
as either female, male, mostly-female, mostly-male, 
androgynous or unknown. We grouped these results into 
male (including male and mostly-male), female 
(including female and mostly female), and unknown 
(including  androgynous  and  unknown).  While we see 
 
Figure 1. Social network of retweet network 
significant differences in sentiment for the male, female, 
and unknown groups, the mostly-male, mostly-female, 
and androgynous groups become impossible to 
distinguish. This is expected considering each of these 
groups would have varying levels of males and females. 
As a result, when analyzing gender we used just the pure 
groups and did not include the “mostly” groups.  
3.4. Other Classifications 
Finally, each tweet was classified as male-only, 
female-only, or combination, depending on the 
candidates mentioned in the tweet. A similar approach 
was then used to classify each tweet as mentioning 
Democrat-only candidates, Republican-only candidates, 
Other-party-only candidates, or some combination of 
parties mentioned. 
4. Results 
The average sentiment score across all tweets 
mentioning any candidates was .0861, meaning, overall, 
the tweets were more positive than they were negative. 
49% of the tweets were neutral (sentiment = 0), 35% 
positive (sentiment > 0), and 16% negative (sentiment < 
0). This distribution of positive/neutral/negative tweets 
is similar to results found in the 2016 [23]. 
When broken down by the ideology of the tweeter, 
tweets from Liberals were more positive 
(sentiment=0.0851) than those originating from 
Conservatives (sentiment=0.0779, p < .0001). There 
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were approximately 5 million tweets for each of the two 
ideologies indicating that neither ideology dominated 
the senate discussion in the Twittersphere. Both had 
68% of tweets being retweets and 32% being original 
tweets. Retweets tended to be more positive (sentiment 
= 0.0947) than original tweets (sentiment = 0.0535). 
4.1. Asymmetry of Affective Polarization 
While we find that Liberals tweet more positively 
than Conservatives, what happens when either discusses 
their own in-group party or the out-group party 
(opposing party)? Figure 2a shows the average 
sentiment score across all 7 weeks based on the ideology 
of the tweeter broken down by whether the tweet 
discusses the in-group party only, the opposing party 
only, or some combination of parties. The sentiments in 
this figure show us that Conservatives tweet more 
positively about their own (in-group) candidates, and 
more negatively about opposing candidates than 
Liberals. When candidates from multiple parties are 
discussed within the same tweet then Conservatives 
tweet slightly more favorably than Liberals. 
 
Figure 2a. Sentiment towards candidates by 
tweeter’s ideology 
Recall that our measure of affective polarization is 
the difference between in-group party sentiment and 
out-group party sentiment. While we can see this 
difference by comparing the spread of the bars in Figure 
2a, Figure 2b goes into more detail by showing the range 
of the overall daily affective polarization across the 7 
weeks. The larger median difference (or greater 
asymmetry) for Conservatives indicates a higher level 
of affective polarization. The larger range of both the 
overall bar, and the 50th percentile, for Conservatives 
indicates that this ideological group also had wider 
fluctuations in polarization over the 7-week period. This 
is our first key finding: The level of affective 
polarization is greater amongst Conservatives than it is 
amongst Liberals. 
 
Figure 2b. Asymmetry of Affective Polarization 
4.2. Gender Differences and Polarization  
When considering the gender of the tweeter, several 
findings come to light. Figure 3a shows the average 
sentiment score for the party of the candidate broken 
down by ideology and gender of the tweeter. For both 
ideologies, women talk more positively about their in-
group party candidate. A one-way ANOVA between 
groups show that there was no difference in groups 
when talking about the out-group (or opposing) party 
candidate, with the exception of Liberal men who talk 
more favorably about Republicans than any other group 
when talking about their opposing party. 
Figure 3a. Sentiment towards candidates by 
tweeter’s gender and ideology 
 
Figure 3b. Average daily polarization by 
tweeter’s gender and ideology 
Figure 3b shows the range of daily polarization 
broken out by the gender of the tweeter (see Table 2 and 
Table 3 in the online Appendix for descriptive 
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statistics). We can see that for both ideological groups, 
women score higher in their level of polarization. 
Liberals are less polarized than Conservatives, however, 
we again observe more daily fluctuation among 
Conservatives. 
4.3. Candidate Gender and Polarization 
In order to understand whether the gender of the 
candidate has any impact on sentiment, we begin by 
classifying each tweet as “Female-Only”, “Male-Only”, 
or “Both” depending on who was mentioned in each 
tweet. Figure 4 shows the average sentiment score based 
on this classification by the gender of the tweeter. 
 
Figure 4. Sentiment towards candidates by 
their gender and by tweeter’s gender 
We see that both men and women talk more 
favorably about male candidates than they do about 
female candidates. Figure 5 shows the sentiment further 
broken down by the ideology of the tweeter. Keep in 
mind that overall women talked more positively about 
men than they did about women.  
 
Figure 5. Sentiment towards candidates by their 
gender and by tweeter’s gender and ideology 
Figure 5 also shows that party affiliation plays a 
strong role in this measure. Both Liberals and 
Conservatives talk more positively about male 
candidates than female candidates. Liberals talk least 
favorably about female candidates and have a much 
wider discrepancy between male and female candidates. 
What is surprising about this result is that there were 
more Democratic female candidates (n=15) than there 
were Republican female candidates (n=6), and given 
that people talked more positively about their in-group 
candidates than the out-group party candidates, it was 
expected that Liberals would talk more positively about 
female candidates than Conservatives. 
4.4. Candidate Gender and Party 
To better understand the unexpected findings from 
Figure 5, we break out sentiment based on all four 
categories; ideology and gender of the tweeter and 
gender and party of the candidate. We can see in Figure 
6 that candidate party does indeed make a significant 
difference when evaluating sentiment based on 
candidate gender.   
Regardless of the gender of the tweeter, Liberals 
talked more positively about male candidates than they 
did about female candidates. Conservatives talked much 
more positively about in-group party female candidates 
than male candidates. Across all groups, female 
candidates of the out-group party had the lowest overall 
sentiment score. 
 
Figure 6. Sentiment towards different 
candidates by tweeter’s ideology and gender 
4.5. Drivers of Affective Polarization 
Given that our measure of polarization is in-group 
party support versus out-group party support, we can 
consider that there are certain candidates, issues, and 
race tenor that will push the in-group party measure 
higher and the out-group party measure lower, resulting 
in an increase in affective polarization. 
To identify these drivers we segmented the tweets 
based on the ideology of the tweeter, the party 
mentioned in the tweet, and whether they are highly 
positive (sentiment score >= 0.5) or highly negative 
(sentiment score <= -0.5). We disregard tweets that did 
not score highly (either positive or negative) so we can 
focus in on the drivers of polarization. The result is eight 
groups of tweets as listed in Table 1.  
We then used these groups of tweets to extract the 
top candidates mentioned, the top hashtags mentioned, 
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and the top adjectives used. These categories give us 
indicators for the drivers of affective polarization based 
on candidates, issues (as seen through hashtags), and 
tenor (as seen through adjectives).  
We looked at the Liberals in which four of the top 
five candidates being talked about positively are women 
and the remaining spot is a man. Two of these 
candidates (Beto O’Rourke and Dianne Feinstein) are in 
both the positive and negative groups, suggesting that 
the polarization pushing up the sentiment score is 
somewhat offset by a decrease in the sentiment score, so 
we would not classify either of these candidates as 
primary drivers of polarization. This leaves the 
remaining female candidates as the most positively-
related polarizing candidates for Liberals (Klobucher, 
Sinema, and Gillibrand), while Kaine, Warren, and 
Heitkamp are the Democratic candidates lessening the 
polarization score since they were talked about the least 
favorably. 
On the other end of affective polarization is the out-
group party score. The lower the average out-group 
party sentiment, the greater the overall polarization 
since it increases the Us-vs-Them measure. The primary 
driver of this would be the highly negative Republican 
candidates. There is only one candidate (McSally) who 
appears in the most negative list and whose low score is 
not offset by also appearing in a number of top positive 
tweets. 
On the Conservative side, four Republican 
candidates (Cruz, Vukmir, Heller, and Hawley) appear 
in both lists (positive and negative) somewhat lessening 
their impact. Patrick Morrisey is the only candidate that 
is in the top 5 most positively talked about Republican 
candidates, but is not also in the top 5 most negatively 
talked about list. 
Pushing Conservative affective polarization up is the 
lower average sentiment score when this group talks 
about Democrats. We see all 5 candidates (4 of whom 
are women) appear in both the positive and negative 
lists. This means that there aren’t obvious Democratic 
candidates who are driving the polarization score for 
Conservatives.  
A key finding from looking at the candidates is that, 
on the Democratic side, female candidates are clearly 
eliciting the most reaction, both positively and 
negatively, across both ideological groups. However, 
there is not an obvious group of candidates that is 
driving polarization. 
Next we examine the issues to better understand if 
they are driving the polarization. Using the hashtags as 
an indicator of issues driving the conversation, we see 
several mentions of hashtags related to Brett Kavanaugh 
(Kavanaugh’s Senate hearings took place during our 
period of study), and then singular mentions of topics 
#metoo, #fakenews. Notably absent are topics related to 
the economy, healthcare, immigration, gun policy, 
taxes, foreign affairs, etc. In fact, most of the hashtags 
were focused on specific candidates or races. These 
findings suggest that in addition to race-specific 
discourse, affective polarization is being driven 
discussions surrounding high-profile polarizing public 
figures, e.g., Brett Kavanaugh and Donald Trump. 
Finally we take a look at the top adjectives that 
appear in the high emotion (positive or negative) tweets. 
We argue that the tenor of the race can be seen through 
the adjectives used in tweets. Pride is clearly felt by both 
ideologies as it appears at the top of both lists. Liberals 
also feel their candidates are “good” and “great” while 
Conservatives also use those terms and add in 
“outstanding” and “fantastic.” When discussing the out-
group party negatively. Liberals use terms such as 
“sad”, “pathetic”, and “bad” while Conservatives use 
terms including “bad”, “sorry”, and “evil.”  
5. Conclusions 
In this work we were interested in understanding if 
affective polarization could be measured using Twitter. 
To accomplish this, we gathered Twitter data during the 
2018 U.S. Senate elections. Using average sentiment 
scores, we defined a way to measure affective 
polarization as the difference between sentiment about 
one’s in-group party minus the sentiment about one’s 
out-group party. This measure provides an additional 
way to look at affective polarization through Twitter, 
including being able to do so in near real-time, e.g., by 
measuring polarization using daily averages. 
We found a greater level of polarization, and larger 
fluctuations in polarization, among Conservatives over 
Liberals. Women having both Liberal and Conservative 
ideologies expressed stronger in-group party support 
and greater dislike of out-group party (opposing party) 
candidates than did their male counterparts. 
Both men and women talked more positively about 
male candidates than they did about female candidates, 
however, Conservatives were more apt to talk favorably 
about female candidates than Liberals. The group of 
candidates uniformly liked least, were female 
candidates of the opposing party.  
We expanded on our findings by using candidate 
mentions, hashtags, and adjectives for the most strongly 
worded positive and negative tweets. We find little 
support that this polarization was being driven by 
specific candidates or topics, with the exception of the 
events leading up to Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment to 
the Supreme Court on October 6. Instead we find 
support that that U.S. Senate races of 2018 were 
dominated by an Us-vs-Them mentality [19], with 
Conservatives using the most strongly worded 
terminology in support of their own (in-group) 
candidates and against the opposing candidates.  
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Table 1. Drivers of polarization 
   Most Frequently Mentioned: 
Twitter 
Users  
Talking 
about  Candidates Hashtags Adjectives 
Liberals 
Democratic 
Candidates 
Positively 
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX) 
Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) 
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 
#metoo 
#votewithbeto 
#flipthesenate 
#betodaysarecoming 
#earlyvoting 
Proud 
Good 
Many 
Great 
F***ing 
 Democratic 
Candidates 
Negatively 
Tim Kaine (D-VA) 
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX) 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) 
Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND) 
#trump 
#virginia 
#johnkelly 
#kavanaugh 
#fakenews 
Sorry 
Impossible 
Stupid 
Angry 
Bad 
 Republican 
Candidates  
Positively 
Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
Rick Scott (R-FL) 
Dean Heller (R-NV) 
Josh Hawley (R-MO) 
Leah Vukmir (R-WI) 
#betofortexas 
#texasdebate 
#nevada 
#kavanaugh 
#votebeto 
Good 
More 
Happy 
Great 
Sexual 
 Republican 
Candidates 
Negatively 
Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
Leah Vukmir (R-WI) 
Dean Heller (R-NV) 
Josh Hawley (R-MO) 
Martha McSally (R-AZ) 
#betoforsenate 
#betofortexas 
#lyinted 
#trump 
#florida 
Sad 
Encouraging 
Pathetic 
Bad 
Afraid 
Conservatives 
Democratic 
Candidates 
Positively 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX) 
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) 
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) 
#loomered 
#1024something 
#votered 
#confirmkavanaugh 
#scotus 
Good 
Own 
More 
Sure 
Great 
 Democratic 
Candidates 
Negatively 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX) 
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) 
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) 
#azsen 
#electionshaveconsequences 
#suckituptoots 
#betoorourke 
#sundaythoughts 
Illegal 
Bad 
Sorry 
Evil 
Fake 
 
Republican 
Candidates  
Positively 
Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
John James (R-MI) 
Patrick Morrisey (R-WV) 
Josh Hawley (R-MO) 
Matt Rosendale (R-MT) 
#txsen 
#choosecruz 
#cruzcrew 
#keeptexasred 
#michigan 
Proud 
Great 
Good 
Outstanding 
Fantastic 
 
Republican 
Candidates  
Negatively 
Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
Rick Scott (R-FL) 
Bob Hugin (R-NJ) 
Josh Hawley (R-MO) 
John James (R-MI) 
#brendasnipes 
#trump2020 
#vasen 
#redwave2018andbeyo 
#nd 
#nj 
Crazy 
Corrupt 
Illegal 
Sorry  
Fake 
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6. Limitations and Future Research 
While we propose a novel measure for affective 
polarization, without longitudinal data we cannot 
comment on the change in this measure over time. We 
have also not tried to quantify the differences in our 
measures when comparing across groups other than 
saying they are larger or smaller. We anticipate 
exploring this in more detail by including additional 
election datasets. 
Our Twitter dataset relies on a gender guessing 
process which left the majority of tweets classified as 
from someone with unknown gender. We see some 
stark differences in how these “unknown” populations 
scored for sentiment between Liberals and 
Conservatives (e.g., see Figure 5) which is an 
opportunity for future exploration. There were also 
several days during our period of study where one 
ideology dipped into negative territory for affective 
polarization; meaning that tweets of that day talking 
about out-group party candidates were more positive 
than tweets about their own candidates. These were 
not gradual changes, but instead were downward 
spikes when viewed over time. This happened three 
times for Liberals and once for Conservatives, and 
could be an indication of either specific events 
occurring or a concentrated effort to drive the 
conversation negatively by an external group.  
Recall that our sentiment scoring mechanism is 
limited to words appearing in tweets. Because of this, 
tweets with only links to other sources or tweets with 
no text, such as photos, were not included.  
Finally, we would caution about reading too much 
into the strong in-group party support for Republican 
female candidates. These numbers decrease 
significantly when the unknowns are included in our 
analysis. Also, with only six female candidates on the 
Republican side, it could swing heavily based on the 
favorability (or lack thereof) of just one or two 
candidates.  
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